

The District of Columbia Mayor's Focused Improvement Area Initiative: *A Review of Past Practice*



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The District of Columbia Crime Policy Institute (DCPI) was established at the Urban Institute in collaboration with the Brookings Institution, through the jointly administered Partnership for Greater Washington Research with funding from the Justice Grants Administration in the Executive Office of the Mayor. DCPI is a nonpartisan, public policy research organization focused on crime and justice policy in Washington, DC. DCPI's mission is to support improvements in the administration of justice policy through evidence-based research. An assessment of the Mayor's Focused Improvement Areas (FIA) Initiative is one of DCPI's three original research projects in FY2010. For more information on DCPI, see <http://www.dccrimepolicy.org>

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This report was funded by the Justice Grants Administration, Executive Office of the District of Columbia Mayor under sub-grant: 2009-JAGR-1114.

We extend our gratitude to the current and previous staff members associated with the Focused Improvement Area Initiative who graciously offered their time to speak with us.

Acronyms	i
1 Introduction	1
1.1 Background	2
2 Program Model	3
2.1 Public Safety	3
2.2 Human and Social Services	4
2.3 Physical and Social Disorder	5
2.4 Outreach Efforts	5
3 Implementation	7
3.1 Challenges	7
3.2 Successes	9
4 Considerations for Next Steps	11
Appendix A: Map of FIA Areas	13

Acronyms

CFSA	Child and Family Services Agency
CSOSA	Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency
CSS	Court Social Services
DC	District of Columbia
DCHAPD	DC Housing Authority Police Department
DCOA	DC Office on Aging
DCPI	District of Columbia Crime Policy Institute
DCPS	DC Public Schools
DCRA	Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Agency
DDOT	Department of Transportation
DHS	Department of Human Services
DMH	Department of Mental Health
DOES	Department of Employment Services
DOH	Department of Health
DPR	Department of Parks and Recreation
DPW	Department of Public Works
DYRS	Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services
EOM	Executive Office of the Mayor
FEMS	Fire and Emergency Medical Services
FIA	Focused Improvement Areas
MPD	The Metropolitan Police Department
MOCRS	Mayor's Office on Community Relations and Services
OCA	Office of the City Administrator
OSSE	Office of the State Superintendent for Education
USAO	United States' Attorney's Office

1 Introduction

In March 2010, the Executive Office of the Mayor/Office of the City Administrator asked the District of Columbia Crime Policy Institute (DCPI) to assess the Mayor's Focused Improvement Area Initiative. The Focused Improvement Area (FIA) Initiative, launched in November 2007, was designed to be a community-based initiative that aimed to reduce criminal activity and increase the quality of life in at-risk communities by combining community policing with human and social services delivery. In an effort to make recommendations on how to strengthen the FIA Initiative, DCPI conducted an assessment based on:

- Interviews with the Initiative's stakeholders—past and present—on the Initiative's mission and background, design, and actual implementation;
- Reviews of programmatic materials and administrative records and field observations of the Initiative's processes and procedures; and
- An exhaustive review of the theoretical and empirical literature on best and promising practices in crime reduction, prevention, and suppression strategies and effective comprehensive community initiatives.

Based on the assessment, DCPI has produced three documents to help guide District stakeholders on a redesign of the FIA Initiative, including:

- An examination of past challenges and successes;
- A review of research literature relevant to collaborative crime reduction;¹ and
- A strategic plan to guide future efforts.²

This report reviews the FIA Initiative's past efforts, including implementation processes and procedures, based on conversations with more than a dozen key government stakeholders in agencies associated with the Initiative, reviews of programmatic materials and administrative records, and field observations over the past ten months. This report describes the Initiative and how it developed over time in order to highlight potential opportunities for strengthening the current model. This report develops over four sections. First, the background for the Initiative is described, including a list of the areas where the Initiative was implemented. The second section details the original program model, including each of the specific components of the Initiative and the outreach efforts. Next, the overall implementation of the FIA Initiative is summarized, including notable successes and challenges, and points to places where implementation differed from the original program design. A fourth and final section highlights some considerations for next steps, which are taken up in greater detail in the strategic plan document.

Before turning to the background for the FIA Initiative, it is worth noting that this review of past practices was not intended as a detailed process or outcome evaluation. The Initiative changed considerably over time, which means that the Initiative would have been a moving target for evaluation. In its current state, the Initiative does not represent the suite of services, level of effort, oversight or collaboration that existed when it was initially implemented. Furthermore, the prerequisites necessary for a formal outcome evaluation, such as baseline measures, performance metrics, or possible comparison locations, were not established at the outset. In sum, this report does not make any independent claims about the Initiative's overall success (or failure) in reducing crime or violence, nor does it evaluate how the Initiatives' outputs or performance are related to crime reductions. Instead, this document intends to provide an overview of the perspective of the key FIA Initiative stakeholders, particularly the government stakeholders, to generate discussion

¹Jannetta, J., M. Denver, C. G. Roman, N. P. Svajlenka, M. Ross, and B. Orr. 2010. *The District of Columbia Mayor's Focused Improvement Area Initiative: Review of the Literature Relevant to Collaborative Crime Reduction*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.

²Lieberman, A., Fontaine, J., Ross, M., Roman, C.G., Roman, J. 2010. *Strategic Plan for a Collaborative Neighborhood-Based Crime Prevention Initiative*. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute.

about the future of the FIA Initiative. As well, we offer our impressions, as independent observers, of the Initiative's design and implementation.

1.1. BACKGROUND

The overarching goal of the FIA Initiative was to implement a comprehensive, citywide partnership based in part on promising practices developed from successful community-based initiatives in other large cities and lessons learned from the District's previous community-based initiatives.³ The FIA Initiative began in 2007 in response to a violent crime spike in the District that prompted the Executive Office of the Mayor (EOM) and the Office of the City Administrator (OCA) to brainstorm with the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) about how to reduce violent crime, particularly homicides, in specific crime hot spots in the city. The goal of the FIA Initiative was to increase police presence and the provision of human and social services to individuals and their families in specific areas at high risk of violence.

Round One FIA Areas:

- Third District (3D) - PSA 302/304
- Fifth District (5D) - PSA 501
- Seventh District (7D) - PSA 706

Round Two FIA Areas:

- First District/Fifth District (1D/5D) - PSA 103/504
- Third District (3D) - PSA 302
- Fourth District (4D) - PSA 403/404
- Seventh District (7D) - PSA 705

The seven areas targeted for the FIA Initiative were identified in two separate rounds (see Appendix A for maps of the FIA areas). Beginning in November 2007, the first round of FIA areas were initially chosen because they exhibited elevated levels of violence, as identified by an analysis by MPD of trends in violent crime and calls for service data. Beginning in May 2008, a second round of FIA areas were added, which included the addition of four other crime hot spots. The second round areas were a mixture of neighborhoods with elevated levels of violence and neighborhoods that experienced a handful of high-profile homicides. Due to the centrality of crime in prompting the Initiative, MPD was tasked with being the lead agency in the FIA Initiative with the support from OCA.

Originally, three Capital City Fellows⁴ managed the Initiative with direction from MPD and oversight from OCA and the former City Administrator Dan Tangherlini.⁵ The Capital City Fellows were placed within MPD and their full-time responsibility was implementation and day-to-day management of the Initiative. The fellows acted as liaisons between the respective government agencies associated with the Initiative. While each fellow managed one FIA area in the first round (three areas in total), they each managed more than one as more FIA areas were included in the second round.

³The initiatives included: "Operation CeaseFire" in Chicago, "Ceasefire" in Boston, Baltimore's "Safe Zones Initiative", and the former District of Columbia Mayor Anthony Williams' "Hot Spot Initiative" spearheaded by former Metropolitan Police Department Chief Charles Ramsey.

⁴The Capital City Fellows are recent graduates of master's degrees programs in public administration, public policy, urban planning and related fields. Fellows serve a two-year fellowship appointment during which they complete four six-month rotations in different city agencies. For more information, see: <http://dchr.dc.gov/dcop/cwp/view,a,1222,q,530470.asp>

⁵Dan Tangherlini resigned from the Executive Office of the Mayor in 2009 to take a position with the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

2 Program Model

To reduce violent crime and increase the quality of life, the Initiative's focus was designed to be three-pronged: increasing public safety in the FIA areas (or FIAs); increasing human and social services to the households and families residing in the FIAs; and reducing signs of physical and social disorder (e.g., broken windows, debris, graffiti) in the FIAs. The key conceptual link between the public safety component and the human and social services component of the Initiative was to address the root causes of crime (i.e., crime prevention). The public safety component was designed to suppress violent crime in the FIAs by increasing police presence, identifying known offenders, and discussing and responding to critical incidents. Meanwhile, the human and social services component was designed to reach out to residents to identify their service needs and coordinate service delivery through various city agencies to prevent additional crimes. The physical and social disorder component—similar to the human and social services component—was designed to prevent additional crimes. More specifically, the FIA Initiative was designed to focus on issues theoretically and empirically associated with crime reduction and prevention, such as school attendance, employment opportunities, youth engagement in meaningful activities, and signs of physical disorder.

The identification and implementation of the FIA Initiative was community-based, while the target of the public safety and human and social services components were designed to focus on the households and families in the FIAs. In other words, while specific areas were targeted for the Initiative using place-based crime data, aspects of the public safety and human and social services component of the Initiative were intended to be person-based, targeted to households and families. The households and families targeted for increased human and social services and public safety efforts within the FIAs were supposed to be identified using three forms of outreach: criminal justice-based; government-based; and community-based.

2.1. PUBLIC SAFETY

Led by MPD, the public safety component of the FIA Initiative was designed to be coordinated among the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA), the DC Housing Authority Police Department (DCHPD), the DC Superior Court Family Court: Court Social Services Division (CSS), the Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS), and the United States' Attorney's Office (USAO). As the lead agency, MPD was charged with tracking criminal investigations occurring in the FIAs, coordinating with the other public safety agencies to identify issues and problem individuals, households, and families residing in the FIAs, and increasing their presence in the FIAs using a community-oriented policing model. Each FIA was to have a team of dedicated officers that maintained a 24-hour presence in their respective FIA, including foot patrol officers, vice officers, and scout cars. Coordination meetings between the public safety agencies were scheduled to occur monthly, with participation expected from the officers assigned to each FIA, MPD Assistant Chief Diane Groomes and representatives from CSOSA, CSS, DYRS, USAO, and DCHPD. The goal of the public safety meetings was for agency representatives to talk about specific people and/or locations within the FIAs and decide an appropriate strategy for responding. Agencies were charged with the following:

- CSOSA¹ was to focus on assisting MPD with outreach primarily, by providing the police department with a list of names of individuals returning to the FIAs from federal prison.
- Similar to the role for CSOSA, the role of CSS² and DYRS³ was to assist MPD with outreach by

¹Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency is a federal agency managing all convicted federal offenders under community supervision in the District of Columbia.

²Court Social Services (CSS) is the juvenile probation system for individuals under age 18 who have not been tried as an adult in the District of Columbia Superior Court.

³The Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) is the District agency that provides detention and aftercare services to

providing information on troubled or court-involved youth, to whom public safety efforts should have been targeted.

- Like MPD's role, DCHPD was to focus on increasing police officer presence in the FIAs to maintain public safety and reduce social disorder in public housing facilities.

From the perspective of MPD, the specific goals for the public safety partners in the FIAs were to: a) reduce the number of homicides; b) reduce the number of guns; c) reduce drug activity; d) reduce the number of truancy cases; e) work with victims of violent crime; and f) engage with the Department of Human Services to provide services. To assess the progress of the FIA Initiative over time and to report on performance measures, a public safety database was designed to track the number and location of guns recovered, the number and location of drug arrests, the number of accountability visits to individuals returning from incarceration conducted by MPD/CSOSA, the number of truancy cases, the number of domestic violence and other victims of violence served, the number of calls for service received in each of the FIA areas, the number of door knocks to distribute needs assessment forms with FIA partners in the FIA areas, and referrals to the Department of Human Services for additional treatment. Reporting templates were designed for each agency, which contained the aforementioned performance measures under each agency's purview. Reports were to be submitted weekly so that MPD could aggregate these measures and produce statistics related to FIA progress.

2.2. HUMAN AND SOCIAL SERVICES

Led by the Department of Human Services (DHS), the human and social services aspect of the FIA Initiative was designed to be coordinated with the Department of Employment Services (DOES), the Department of Mental Health (DMH), DC Public Schools (DCPS), the Child and Family Services Agency (CFSA), the Department of Health (DOH), the Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department (FEMS), the DC Office on Aging (DCOA), the Consumer and Regulatory Affairs Agency (DCRA), and the Office of the State Superintendent for Education (OSSE). By design, the focus of the human and social services agencies was on the household and family, not the individual. The purpose of the human and social services agencies participation was to provide comprehensive services to families and households in the FIAs to address some of the root causes of violent crime (e.g., poverty, drug abuse, unemployment). The public safety partners, including MPD and DYRS, were also expected to participate in the human and social services delivery component.

Case managers and social workers from DHS' Strong Families Program were to develop case management plans for each household and family that wanted to participate in the FIA Initiative, with input from the other human and social services agencies. Case management plans were to be developed using information from a self-assessment tool that asked about service needs spanning multiple agencies and requested a signed consent to share data across agencies. Case management plans were to be supplemented by a DHS-administered assessment tool. Tasks were to be assigned to the human and social services agencies, including MPD and DYRS, depending on the information gleaned from the assessment tools. As determined by the self- or DHS-administered assessment tools, tasks assigned to the human and social services agencies were intended to range from assistance with job opportunities to assistance with income maintenance to assistance with bed bug removal. The human and social services team was to meet weekly to talk about active cases, the status of the tasks assigned to the relevant agencies for the households and families, barriers to addressing household and family needs, and action steps necessary to complete the assigned tasks.

Tasks assigned to the human and social services agencies were to be tracked using a database. This database, which was designed to be used for preparation in the weekly case review meetings, included fields for basic sociodemographic information on individuals in each household and family, household or family needs, and the tasks assigned to the household or family, by agency. Case reports were to be run frequently to

individuals under age 18 committed into their care by the District of Columbia Superior Court.

ensure that cases were being managed appropriately and services were being delivered. Case workers from DHS were to close cases when all of the separate tasks assigned through the assessment forms had been satisfied or after multiple attempts to reach out to an individual or household were unsuccessful. Once a case was closed, the database was not designed to include long-term tracking of the household or family. That is, the household or family was not supposed to be tracked in the FIA database unless another service request (or task) was submitted. The database was designed so that cases could be viewed by agency, by assigned task and the estimated completion, by individual or household, by neighborhood, or by the referral (or outreach) method.

2.3. PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL DISORDER

Led by the Mayor's Office on Community Relations and Services (MOCRS), the physical and social disorder component of the FIA Initiative was designed to be coordinated with the Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR), the Department of Public Works (DPW), and the Department of Transportation (DDOT) as well as MPD and DCRA. Staff members from MOCRS were to conduct frequent "walk-throughs" in the FIAs with the high-ranking government officials, such as the mayor, city cabinet members, and agency directors to identify evidence of physical and social disorder in the FIAs (e.g., abandoned cars, broken street lights, and broken windows). MOCRS was to coordinate walk-throughs in every FIA and take the lead in deciding which agency should address a given issue. Communication with the community residents was to be a primary objective for the walk-throughs, during which government officials could hear directly from the community members about problems they were facing and then to provide information about services the agencies were offering. Also, MOCRS was to coordinate weekend clean-ups to mobilize community members, volunteers, and community- and faith-based organizations in the FIAs.

2.4. OUTREACH EFFORTS

As designed, the FIA Initiative had a three-pronged outreach effort to identify target households and families, specifically as the focus of the public safety efforts and delivery of human and social services. These outreach efforts were to include:

- **Government-Based Outreach (human and social services provision):** By walking through the FIAs, knocking on the doors of FIA residents, and periodic placement of a resource van or service center in the FIAs, the government-based outreach was designed to gather a listing of residents in need of, and wanting, the services offered by the human and social services agencies associated with the FIA Initiative. This type of outreach was to be led by the Capital City Fellows/MPD, DHS, DOH, and DOES. Households and families were to fill out a self-assessment form to inform service delivery. The self-assessment form was to be supplemented by a DHS assessment form. The DHS assessment form was designed to capture the household and family needs in greater detail, by exploring family assets and deficits using trained case managers and social workers. In addition, DHS was to conduct targeted outreach to specific households and families by reviewing their case management systems to see who had been engaged with their agency multiple times. The government-based outreach that occurred in the FIAs was also designed to include the distribution of energy-efficient light bulbs and smoke detectors, among other things, to fulfill immediate service needs.
- **Criminal Justice-Based Outreach (public safety efforts and human and social services provision):** By coordinated monitoring, supervision, and intelligence sharing, MPD, CSOSA, CSS, and DYRS were to target public safety efforts to the households and families in the FIAs that were known to their agencies. When other non-criminal justice needs were identified, referrals to the appropriate human and social service agencies associated with the FIA Initiative were to be made.

- **Community-Based Outreach (public safety efforts and human and social services provision):** Community collaboratives and community- and faith-based organizations operating in the District were to reach out to residents in the FIAs to inform the public safety efforts and the provision of human and social services. Organizations associated with the FIA Initiative included nonprofits and public-private entities such as the Columbia Heights/Shaw Collaborative; East of the River Clergy, Police, Community Partnership; Edgewood/Brookland; Far Southeast; Latin American Youth Center; North Capital Collaborative; and Peaceaholics. Since the collaboratives and faith- and community-based agencies already had a presence in the FIAs, the goal for these agencies was to inform the public safety efforts to households and families that the collaboratives/organizations knew were at risk of violence and to help conduct referrals to the human and social services agencies accordingly. From the perspective of the government stakeholders who designed the FIA Initiative, the community-based outreach was not intended to introduce a new activity to these agencies stated missions or activities. Instead, the community-based outreach was designed to ensure that community-based organizations funneled individuals and households who they already had contact and interaction with into the FIA Initiative and its associated agencies.

3 Implementation

By design, the FIA Initiative was comprehensive and included many stakeholders across city government. Despite some challenges, which are discussed below, many aspects of the Initiative were implemented as designed. While some specific aspects of the Initiative's design were not fully actualized, the only significant component of the overall design that never developed was the community-based outreach. The other outreach efforts—government-based and criminal justice-based—were generally implemented as designed and are still ongoing (albeit less frequently than they occurred originally).

According to the stakeholders, the government-based outreach successfully met its goal of knocking on the door of every resident in the FIAs to administer the self-assessments.¹ Since the Initiative was implemented, the stakeholders indicated that more than 1,000 individuals completed the self-assessment form designed for the FIA Initiative. They also indicated that all of the families identified as needing services through the assessment forms received some form of follow-up from a FIA partner agency. The community walk-throughs were also implemented as designed, though these walkthroughs are no longer happening. As for reporting on the FIA Initiative's performance and progress with respect to human and social services, DHS continues to track active case tasks through the database developed specifically for the FIA Initiative and manages cases accordingly.

As for the criminal justice-based outreach, though outreach was conducted, it was not based on data and intelligence sharing between the criminal justice agencies. For example, confidentiality laws surrounding District of Columbia youth precluded CSS and DYRS from sending MPD a list of juveniles who had problems that needed follow-up or additional treatment. CSS and DYRS did not provide the names or information of system-involved youth to MPD directly. Therefore, most of the criminal justice-based outreach has been conducted by MPD. As for the FIA Initiative's performance and progress with respect to crime, MPD continues to collect crime data within each of the FIAs, and reports that their internal data show reductions in crime in the FIAs since the Initiative's implementation.

Once the Capitol City Fellows associated with the FIA Initiative ended their rotations with the city in 2008, day-to-day management for the overall Initiative shifted to program analysts within the OCA/EOM. At this time, management of the Initiative rests within OCA/EOM, though many suggest that DHS should be the lead management agency. Although the Capital City Fellows no longer manage the Initiative, regular, but separate, public safety and human service meetings are ongoing. During the public safety meetings, officers from each FIA discuss the recent crime patterns in the FIAs and take steps to address these issues. CSOSA is working with MPD to devise a strategy to focus on individuals returning from incarceration to the FIAs. In the human services meetings, agency representatives continue to manage the cases, discuss outstanding tasks, and identify next steps for the FIA families. Over time, the FIA Initiative seems to have evolved into two distinct and loosely-related efforts, where the public safety effort is focused on suppressing crime in the FIAs while the human and social services efforts are focused on increasing service delivery. While leadership from MPD manages the public safety effort of the FIA Initiative, and leadership from DHS manages the human and social services effort, no one person manages the entire effort *across* agencies.

3.1. CHALLENGES

While the Initiative received support from the highest level of city government since its inception, the city leadership did not design the Initiative in such a way as to ensure a sustained interagency, collaborative effort focused on measuring and assessing improvements in household and family outcomes or reducing violent crime in communities. Despite successful implementation of the main components, implementation

¹Though FIA stakeholders knocked on every door in the FIAs, some share of FIA residents declined to open their doors to government stakeholders or were not at home at the time of the agencies' visits.

of the Initiative faced specific challenges in four broad areas: oversight; collaboration; outreach; and data sharing.

First, though the Initiative includes many stakeholders, there is no one agency or leader within one agency that has direct oversight over its success (or failure) and performance. Management from the Capital City Fellows ended in late 2008, the City Administrator who initially championed the Initiative resigned in 2009, and management responsibility within the OCA/EOM has changed several times. Yet, there has never been a point person or leader identified within the Initiative with enough political clout to manage the Initiative and sustain it *across* agencies. The lack of consistent, authoritative management has led to a reduction in momentum over time. The two agencies consistently identified as the strongest agency partners in the FIA Initiative—DHS and MPD—assigned staff persons within their agency to lead and manage the effort, but neither agency could compel other government agencies to participate. Though the vision for the overall FIA Initiative was clear, the lack of defined leadership and day-to-day management inhibited success in meeting goals and objectives.

Second, although meetings on the status of the public safety goals (e.g., calls for service, arrests, and violent crime rates) and the human and social services tasks were and are occurring, some key agencies have not had a consistent presence at these meetings. Further, there has been no coordinated effort to identify and mobilize additional agencies and partners that were not engaged in the FIA Initiative from the outset, such as the DC Department of Corrections or the Office of Ex-Offender Affairs, for example. More importantly, there has been no coordinated effort to mobilize agencies that exhibited limited engagement in the Initiative. In addition, meetings on the status of the public safety component and the human and social services components were and are not coordinated. These meetings occur within the respective agencies, independently, and are only loosely linked. The limited scope and depth of the partnership is likely due to the lack of a defined leadership structure.

Third, outreach to the neighborhoods and households and families within the FIAs was inconsistent across the three methods. The FIA Initiative's outreach efforts were strongest among the government agencies and weakest among the community collaboratives and faith- and community-based agencies. Within the government-based outreach, some agencies' outreach to households and families was stronger than others. This is likely related to the flexibility of the agencies, by design, in their ability to outreach into communities, without additional funding or staffing, at alternate times and in innovative ways (e.g., vans and neighborhood centers on the weekends or after business hours). The weakness of the community-based outreach may have been due to the agencies' limited capacity to do the additional outreach the Initiative stakeholders envisioned. Since the collaboratives were not involved in designing the overall strategy, their organizational capacity to conduct additional outreach was likely not fully considered before incorporating their services into the Initiative. Further, since most of the city collaboratives are oriented toward youth, the Initiative's focus on the household and family may have required expertise and infrastructure these organizations did not possess. While there was some effort by city stakeholders to incorporate the collaboratives' outreach into the FIA Initiative formally through the Community-Based Violence Prevention Fund in 2009, these efforts never moved forward.

Fourth, outreach to at-risk families by the agencies was limited by prohibitions on agency data sharing, particularly due to confidentiality issues for youth. Ideally, the FIA Initiative would use an active case management database culling information from all of the agencies participating in the Initiative, which should be managed by the Initiative's leadership. For example, instead of needs being identified solely through the self-assessment forms, the case management database should have used existing, administrative information about service needs and service receipt for households and families in the FIAs. In this way, criminal justice and social service histories across agencies would be maintained in one system. As well, a more comprehensive solution to household and family needs could be identified. Instead of tracking families and their service needs and receipt, the existing FIA database simply tracked whether tasks were assigned and completed. For example, the Initiative database tracks family needs as identified in the self-assessment forms (assistance with finding a job), what agency that task was assigned to (Department of

Employment Services), and then whether the family received that assistance (Department of Employment Services called the family and/or sent them information about job opportunities). There was no ability to track changes in household and family functioning over time and link services to long-term impacts. To be clear, using the above example, there was no ability to see whether the family member who needed a job actually got a job or retained a job after a period of time. Further, despite the creation of a public safety database to track performance measures across agencies and overall FIA success from a public safety perspective, data was irregularly collected by some of the agencies. As previously stated, MPD internal records demonstrate crime reductions in the FIAs since the Initiative's inception. Yet, there is no robust empirical data across all of the public safety partners to assess the FIA Initiative's public safety progress fully.

3.2. SUCCESSES

Based on conversations with numerous stakeholders, several consistent themes on notable successes of the overall Initiative have emerged.

- **Peer learning across government agencies:** The FIA Initiative allowed law enforcement and human and social services agencies to learn from one another. Specifically, police officers assigned to the FIAs have been invested in the service delivery component of the FIA Initiative and report a better understanding of the extent of services available to individuals in the city. In addition, the police officers have been trained to identify social and human services issues within households and families and to view DHS and other agencies as a partner to address those issues. As a result, the FIA patrol officers now have an expanded knowledge of the types of services provided by the government. Similarly, human services agencies have learned to work with MPD and now partner with MPD officers to safely, and thus more efficiently, deliver services within the FIAs.
- **Cross-agency relationship building:** Though the meetings of public safety and human and social service partners has suffered from a lack of participation from some agencies, the agencies that do attend have developed key contacts that provide for a more swift and effective response to household and family issues. Building a rapport among agencies has facilitated the knowledge of each agency's function, resources, and capacity. Eventually, it may break barriers to information sharing and create a forum to address organizational and logistical barriers to success.
- **Changes in the social service paradigm:** Some human and social services agencies have been open to changing the way they conduct their business. These agencies have been open to delivering services proactively instead of having households and families come to their offices to receive services. They have been open to going into the communities to find households and families who need services. Further, some agencies appear to have accepted the notion of person-centered or household-centered service delivery despite traditional service delivery mechanisms that focus more broadly on the community or city.
- **Participation from the households and families within the FIA areas:** In general, households and families have participated in the Initiative from the beginning; they have been open to filling out self-assessment forms and DHS assessment forms, consenting to have their information shared across agencies, and willing to engage with agencies during the walkthroughs and with the resource vans. While this participation may not have been caused by the FIA Initiative, per se, it is important to note that households and families were willing to work with government agencies. Stakeholders noted that participation across the FIAs varied and their ability to help families and households was more successful when the household and family problems necessitated a quick response (e.g., getting a smoke detector, referral to services) instead of prolonged follow-up (e.g., getting a job, locating housing).

- **Belief in the model:** While there have been challenges, there appears to be overwhelming support for the model underlying the Initiative's design. A lack of momentum in certain areas is not due to a lack of belief in the need for an integrated law enforcement and human and social services model focused on the community. Stakeholders believe it is important to address crime holistically by addressing some of the root causes through the provision of human and social services in addition to a public safety response.

4 Considerations for Next Steps

Since the FIA Initiative was developed in response to a spike in violent crime, there was limited planning and benchmarking prior to implementation. While several program documents have been produced and performance measures have been established over the past three years, there is no strategic plan guiding the overall FIA Initiative that all of the partners have agreed to and are aware of. As a result, there have been challenges sustaining the Initiative due to confusion about whether the key goals and objectives for the Initiative, for the neighborhoods, for the households and families, and for the agencies have been met.

For example, it is not clear what indicators should guide the implementation of the Initiative in other areas or what indicators need to be changed or improved to prompt the Initiative or some partners to move to another area. Other than the general goal of reducing crime in the FIAs, there were no specific, measurable, long-term outcomes or goals associated with the FIA Initiative, such as: a 10 percent reduction in youth violence over a specific time period; a 10 percent reduction in truancy rates over a specific period of time; or a 10 percent increase in employment retention among adults or youth over a specific time period. While internal MPD reports demonstrate crime reductions in the FIAs, there should have been more specificity about how the specific components of the FIA Initiative, some of which are long-term solutions to crime problems while others are short-term solutions, fit into an overall strategy designed to impact individual, household, and/or community outcomes. More specificity of goals and how they fit into an overall strategy would help guide implementation in the FIAs and determine whether and when the Initiative should move to other areas.

There are several key issues that remain unresolved. The resolution to these issues is likely to differ with respect to which public safety or human and social services outcomes have primacy. This further underscores the importance of ensuring these two components are more tightly linked into one coherent strategy.






- **Entrance strategy:** Is there an opportunity for additional FIAs? What areas of the city need the services and increased police presence? What is the optimal number of FIAs that the city should serve?
- **Exit strategy:** At what point are the FIAs ready to be “closed out”? What determines success? What is the optimal amount of time an area should be included in the FIA Initiative?
- **Geographic focus:** Is the geographic focus and size of the FIAs—areas that do not entirely map onto defined neighborhood boundaries—appropriate? Could the FIAs’ size and location be aligned with its key objectives and activities more appropriately?
- **Reincorporate performance measurement:** Can the Initiative improve its collection of performance measurement data such that it is robust enough for analysis? Would the results from the analysis be used to guide future decisions?
- **Crime prevention strategy:** Is there a role for crime prevention to address risk factors for crime? Should crime prevention target all citizens in a FIA, only those with serious risk factors, and/or those who are actively criminal or have been? How do the human and social services data inform where crime may be increasing?
- **Combination of services in the FIAs:** Can the FIA Initiative focus on targeted crime prevention *and* crime reduction, i.e., can the focus in some FIAs be on increased police presence to reduce crime while others are focused on increasing social services to prevent crime or some combination thereof? What is the optimal level and combination of services in these places?
- **Leadership:** What is the right agency to lead such an initiative, based on the stated long-term goals? What person within that agency can be held responsible for overseeing all of the components? How should the agencies communicate and/or collaborate? In what agency should the point person(s) for

each FIA be located and how do other agencies communicate, coordinate and collaborate with those point people?

- **Key Goals and Objectives:** Is a focus on reducing signs of physical and social disorder the right priority for the FIAs or should some other objective, such as violence reduction, have primacy?

The goal for the next phase of the Initiative, or any other neighborhood-based crime initiative, is to develop a strategic plan for operations that addresses these and other issues. To help District stakeholders do this, DCPI has produced a report on best and promising community-based strategies to document the options available in designing a comprehensive, community-based strategy with intra-agency collaboration. With this information and lessons learned from implementing the FIA Initiative to date, DCPI has also created a strategic plan to aid stakeholders in designing an initiative to meet the District's needs and capabilities.

A Maps of FIA Areas





3RD DISTRICT - PSA's 302 & 304 ROUND 1 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA

Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, DC
February 23, 2009




Research & Analysis Branch
Strategic Services Bureau
Metropolitan Police Department
300 Indiana Avenue, Room 5126
Washington, DC 20001
202.727.4174 (p)
202.727.0711 (f)

PSA & DISTRICT GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE:
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) data as of
02/23/2009
MAJOR ROAD GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE: Office of the
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Geographic Information
System (GIS) data as of 02/23/2009.

Scale: 1:2,725

0 0.010.02 0.04 Miles


MAP ID: 3RD DISTRICT - PSA's 302 & 304
ROUND 1 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA
Crime Analyst: Charles S.L. Jackson, M.A.
Unit: Research & Analysis Branch
Date: February 23, 2009



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
Coord. System:

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5TH DISTRICT - PSA 501 ROUND 1 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA



Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, DC
February 23, 2009



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Washington, DC 20001
202.727.4174 (p)
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
PSA & DISTRICT GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE:
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) data as of
02/23/2009
MAJOR ROAD GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE: Office of the
Chief Technology Officer (OCTO) Geographic Information
System (GIS) data as of 02/23/2009.

Scale: 1:6,150

0.0004 0.08 Miles

MAP ID: 5TH DISTRICT - PSA 501
ROUND 1 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA
Crime Analyst: Charles L. Jackson, M.A.
Unit: Research & Analysis Branch
Date: February 23, 2009


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



Coord. System:
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
7TH DISTRICT - PSA 706 ROUND 1 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA



<p>Metropolitan Police Department Washington, DC February 23, 2009</p>  <p>Research & Analysis Branch Strategic Services Bureau Metropolitan Police Department 300 Indiana Avenue, Room 5126 Washington, DC 20001 202.727.4174 (p) 202.727.0711 (f)</p>	<p>PSA & DISTRICT GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE: Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) data as of 02/23/2009 MAJOR ROAD GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE: Office of the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Geographic Information System (GIS) data as of 02/23/2009.</p>	<p>Scale: 1:4,900</p> <p>00.01503 0.06 Miles</p> 	<p>MAP ID: 7TH DISTRICT - PSA 706 ROUND 1 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA Crime Analyst: Charles S. L. Jackson, M.A. Unit: Research & Analysis Branch Date: February 23, 2009</p>	<p>Information on this map is for illustration only. The user acknowledges and agrees that the use of this information is at the sole risk of the user. No endorsement, liability, insurance, or other financial or legal responsibility are assumed or accepted by any agency of the District of Columbia Government.</p> 	<p>Coord. System: NAD_1983_StatePlane_Maryland_FIPS_1900</p>
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1ST / 5TH DISTRICT - PSA's 103 & 504 ROUND 2 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA



Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, DC
February 23, 2009




Research & Analysis Branch
Strategic Services Bureau
Metropolitan Police Department
300 Indiana Avenue, Room 5126
Washington, DC 20001
202.727.4174 (p)
202.727.0711 (f)

PSA & DISTRICT GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE:
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) data as of
02/23/2009
MAJOR ROAD GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE: Office of the
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Geographic Information
System (GIS) data as of 02/23/2009.

Scale: 1:6,900

0.02605 0.1 Miles

MAP ID: 1ST/5TH DISTRICT - PSA's 103 & 504
ROUND 2 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA
Crime Analyst: Charles L. Jackson, M.A.
Unit: Research & Analysis Branch
Date: February 23, 2009



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3RD DISTRICT - PSA 302 ROUND 2 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA



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Washington, DC
February 23, 2009



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
PSA & DISTRICT GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE:
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) data as of
02/23/2009
MAJOR ROAD GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE: Office of the
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Geographic Information
System (GIS) data as of 02/23/2009.

Scale: 1:5,750

0.00033 0.06 Miles

MAPID: 3RD DISTRICT - PSA 302
ROUND 2 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA
Crime Analyst: Charles S. L. Jackson, M.A.
Unit: Research & Analysis Branch
Date: February 23, 2009


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4TH DISTRICT - PSA's 403 & 404 ROUND 2 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA



Metropolitan Police Department
Washington, DC
February 23, 2009



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
PSA & DISTRICT GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE:
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) data as of
02/23/2009
MAJOR ROAD GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE: Office of the
Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Geographic Information
System (GIS) data as of 02/23/2009.

Scale: 1:7,500

0.00630.06 Miles

MAP ID: 4TH DISTRICT - PSA's 403 & 404
ROUND 2 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA
Crime Analyst: Charles L. Jackson, M.A.
Unit: Research & Analysis Branch
Date: February 23, 2009

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7TH DISTRICT - PSA 705 ROUND 2 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA



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MAJOR ROAD GEOSPATIAL DATA SOURCE: Office of the
Chief Technology Officer (OCTO) Geographic Information
System (GIS) data as of 02/23/2009.

Scale: 1:3,920

0.012625 0.05 Miles

MAP ID: 7TH DISTRICT - PSA 705
ROUND 2 FOCUS IMPROVEMENT AREA
Crime Analyst: Charles L. Jackson, M.A.
Unit: Research & Analysis Branch
Date: February 23, 2009



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